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Wheaton College
1970; Richards, Smith, & Davis, 1989).
The most consistent finding of “good religion” 
has to do with Allport and Ross’s (1967) work on 
religious orientation, in which they make a distinc- 
tion between intrinsically and extrinsically religious 
individuals. This differentiation has proven useful in 
a number of studies. Several studies propose that 
intrinsics enjoy a healthier religious experience than 
extrinsics (Bergin, 1991; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 
1987; Donahue, 1985; Watson, Morris, Foster, & 
Hood, 1986; Watson, Hood, & Morris, 1985; Watson, 
Morris, & Hood, 1988) as they tend to “find their 
master motive in religion” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 
434), as compared to extrinsics who appear to eval- 
uate their religious beliefs in light of their other 
needs—security, social contacts, self-justification, etc.
Though guilt has been theoretically linked to 
psychological disturbance, the relationships among 
religion, guilt, and disturbance have been debated 
vigorously. Guilt has sometimes been perceived as a 
maladaptive and self-defeating emotion accompany- 
ing religious faith (Ellis, I960), and sometimes as an 
emotion that reflects empathy for others and leads 
to useful reparative actions (Mowrer & 
Veszelovszky, 1980; Tangney, 1991). This distinction 
was highlighted in the 1980 debate among Allen 
Bergin (1980a, 1980b), Albert Ellis (1980), and Gary 
Walls (1980) in the Journal of Consulting and Clint- 
cal Psychology. In his description of theistic values, 
Bergin (1980a) included taking responsibility and 
providing restitution for one’s actions, and accepting 
“guilt, suffering, and contrition as keys to change” 
(p. 100). Ellis (1980) responded that while one 
should take responsibility for harmful and immoral 
acts, feelings of guilt should be minimized. Ellis 
defined guilt as “self-damnation in addition to 
denouncing one’s acts” (p. 636). Elsewhere, Ellis has 
described the guilt resulting from the concept of sin 
as “the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neu-
Religious orientation and psychological func- 
tioning were investigated in an analog 
study with 83 participants. After completing 
the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & 
Ross, 1967), participants read a continuous 
narrative with three scenarios in which they 
first committed a dishonest act, and then felt 
compelled to confess what they had done. 
The final scenario contained a manipulation 
of grace or no-grace, in which half of the 
participants were forgiven for their act and 
half were not. Following each scenario, par- 
ticipants were tested for feelings of guilt and 
related behavioral and emotional respons- 
es. Intrinsically religious participants were 
more prone to guilt, more likely to confess 
their wrongdoing, and more likely to for- 
give themselves than extrinsically religious 
subjects. Guilt was found to have a médiat- 
ing effect between intrinsic religiousness and 
some, but not all, outcome variables. The 
potentially beneficial consequences of guilt 
are discussed.
In 1980 Bergin (1980b) suggested that some aspects of religious beliefs may contribute to mental health, and that psychologists need to 
empirically evaluate these facets of religion 
(Bergin, 1980a). Several studies suggest there is in 
fact what can appropriately be termed “good reli- 
gion” that does not distract from mental health, and 
perhaps contributes to it (Allport & Ross, 1967; 
Bergin, 1983, 1991; Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 
1987; Bergin, Stinchfield, Gaskin, Masters, & Sulli- 
van, 1988; Lindenthal, Myers, Pepper, & Stern,
Requests for reprints may be sent to Katheryn Rhoads Meek, 
MA, Department of Psychology, Wheaton College, Wheaton, 
IL 60187.
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gious orientation, experiences of guilt and forgive- 
ness, and self-reported well-being. We hypothesized 
that intrinsically religious participants will be more 
likely than extrinsically religious participants to feel 




Participants in the study were 64 women and 44 
men recruited at Loyola University of Chicago. Of 
the 108 participants, 53 were recruited from a cam- 
pus chapter of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, and 
55 from undergraduate psychology classes. The 
InterVarsity students participated on a voluntary 
basis and the undergraduate students received class 
credit for their participation.
Manipulation
Participants were informed that the study was 
designed to assess dating and work attitudes of col- 
lege populations. After completing an informed con- 
sent form, participants were given a packet of ques- 
tionnaires and hypothetical scenarios in the 
following order: a measure of religious orientation, a 
narrative description of a hypothetical scenario, a set 
of Likert-scale items on which participants rated 
their likely response to scenario, a second hypothet- 
ical scenario, a second set of Likert-scale items, a 
third hypothetical scenario, and a third set of Likert- 
scale items.
The three hypothetical scenarios developed for 
this study comprise the experimental manipulation. 
All participants received identical scripts for the first 
two scenarios, except that gender references were 
matched with the gender of the participants. The 
first scenario was designed to induce feelings of 
guilt by creating a situation in which the person 
reads that he/she chose to lie to his/her boss by 
calling in sick in order to go on a date with a person 
he/she has been interested in for 2 months. The sec- 
ond scenario added information to the first, and was 
designed to increase feelings of guilt by hypotheti- 
cally placing the person at the scene of the date, a 
party, in which he or she runs into a co-worker who 
is close to the boss. This co-worker informs the per- 
son that he/she has been working extra hours in 
order to have this day off and naturally assumes that 
the person has done the same. The scenario ends 
with the person hypothetically waking up the day 
after and realizing that there is no alternative but to
rotic disturbance” (Ellis, I960, p. 192).
An interesting finding reported by Richards 
(1991) is that intrinsically religious participants score 
higher on a guilt-proneness scale than extrinsic par- 
ticipants. However, despite being more prone to 
guilt feelings, intrinsics do not report more depres- 
sion or less existential well-being than other partici- 
pants. Similarly, Tangney and her colleagues have 
reported several studies suggesting that guilt-prone- 
ness, unlike shame-proneness, is unrelated to psy- 
chological maladjustment (Burggraf & Tangney, 
1990; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney, 1991; 
Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 
1991; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).
Thus, guilt, for the intrinsically religious, is not 
always a negative phenomenon. For example, when 
Israel’s King David committed adultery and murder, 
he felt deep remorse:
Wash away all my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin. 
For I know my transgressions, and my sin is always before 
me. Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is 
evil in your sight, so that you are proved right when you 
speak and justified when you judge. (Psalm 51: 2-4)
David’s sorrowful remorse led him to marvel at 
God’s grace rather than fall into a state of excessive 
self-deprecation. He later concluded: “Cleanse me 
with hyssop, and I will be clean; wash me, and I 
will be whiter than snow” (Psalm 51:7).
Christian authors have used these biblical exam- 
pies to note a positive role for remorse or certain 
forms of guilt. Narramore (1984) distinguishes 
between constructive sorrow, a remorseful 
response leading to confession and reconciliation, 
and guilt, a self-focused response that damages 
one’s self-image. Richards (1991) exhorts counselors 
to make a similar distinction in their work with reli- 
giously devout students:
Thus, although religiously devout students may be more 
prone to guilt, counselors should not assume that this is 
dysfunctional for them. In their desire to help clients feel 
better, practitioners have at times indiscriminately attempt- 
ed to neutralize clients’ guilt without giving sufficient con- 
sidération to whether the guilt was an appropriate emo- 
tional response to actual wrongdoings, (p. 194)
Such divergent conclusions, coupled with 
Bergin’s (1980a) suggestion that psychologists con- 
duct empirical investigations on the effects of reli- 
gious beliefs, warrant further investigation concern- 
ing the effects of religious orientation and guilt on 
emotions and behaviors. The present study was 
designed to explore the relationship between reli­
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4. How likely are you to call back and tell 
the truth?
5. How likely is it that you would do this 
again in the future?
6. How likely are you to feel good about
getting the day off?
After reading the second scenario, participants 
responded to a similar set of questions, rated on the 
same Likert-scale format as the first set of questions:
1. How likely are you to feel guilty about
calling in sick?
2. How likely are you to call your boss and
confess the truth?
3. How likely are you to repeat this action in 
the future?
4. How likely are you to feel good about
getting the day off?
After the final scenario, participants responded to 
the following questions on a Likert scale where 1 is 
“to a very small extent” and 10 is “to a very great 
extent”:
1. To what extent do you feel better about 
calling?
2. To what extent do you feel happy about 
calling?
3. To what extent are you prone to repeating 
this action?
4. To what extent do you feel good about
the date?
5. To what extent do you feel good about
getting an extra day off?
6. To what extent do you feel guilty?
7. To what extent do you feel forgiven?
8. To what extent do you forgive yourself?
9. To what extent do you feel that telling the 
truth is enough for you to go back to
work with a clean conscience?
10. To what extent to you feel that God has 
forgiven you?
Analysis
First, three 2x3 split-plot Analyses of Variance 
(anovas)  were computed to investigate the effects of 
religious orientation on self-reported emotions and 
predicted behaviors. Religious orientation was the 
between-subjects and level of information (scenario 
1-scenario 2־־scenario 3) was the repeated-measures 
factor. To control for the increased probability of 
Type I error resulting from multiple hypothesis tests, 
we selected a conservative alpha level of .01. Sec- 
ond, to assess likelihood of confession, another
call the boss and confess the untruth.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions for the third scenario. Half the partie- 
ipants were given a “grace” scenario in which they 
hypothetically call their boss to confess, apologize, 
offer various forms of compensation, and ask for 
forgiveness. In this “grace” scenario the boss is read- 
ily understanding and forgiving, demanding no 
compensation except a promise to come to him or 
her in the future first if a similar situation should 
arise. The other half of the participants were given a 
“no-grace” scenario in which they call their boss and 
offer the same confession as the first group. Howev- 
er, in this scenario the boss is harsh, overtly angry, 
and unforgiving. The “no-grace” scenario ends with 
the boss telling the worker that if he or she (the 
boss) weren’t so short staffed, he or she (the worker) 
would definitely be fired.
After reading and completing the packet, par- 
ticipants were debriefed and thanked for their par-
ticipation.
Instruments
The Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 
1967) was used to measure intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiousness. Those scoring above the median on 
the intrinsic scale and below the median on the 
extrinsic scale were classified as intrinsic. Those scor- 
ing above the median on the extrinsic scale and 
below the median on the intrinsic scale were classi- 
27) were = )מ fied as Extrinsic. Some participants 
dropped from the analysis because they either 
scored above the median on both the intrinsic and 
extrinsic scales (what Allport and Ross called proreli- 
giousness) or because they scored below the median 
on both scales (nonreligious), leaving 42 intrinsically 
religious and 41 extrinsically religious participants. 
Likert-type scales were used after each hypothet- 
ical scenario to assess whether intrinsics and extrin- 
sics differ in perceptions of guilt, grace, and forgive- 
ness, and likelihood of committing and repeating 
the wrongful act. Participants indicated their 
response to each statement on 10-point Likert scales, 
where 1 is “not at all likely” and 10 is “extremely 
likely.” After the first scenario, they answered the
following questions:
1. How likely are you to feel guilty about 
calling in sick?
2. How likely are to to have called in sick?
3. How likely are you to have talked to your 
?boss earlier and tried to get the day off
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Table 1
Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations on Likert-Scale Items by 
Religious Orientation Following Each o f the Three Scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenarie 2 Scenario 3
Items I E I E I E
Guilt
M 9.41 7.66 9.81 8.66 7.38 6.83
SD 1.08 2.60 0.55 1.65 3.07 2.68
n 42 41 42 41 42 41
Likelihood of committing 
similar act in the future 
M 2.07 3.59 1.55 2.73 1.64 2.83
SD 1.7 6 2.39 1.33 1.88 1.53 2.31
n 42 41 42 41 42 41
Feeling good about 
getting day off 
M 2.81 4.37 1.95 3.17 2.02 3.63
SD 2.93 3.05 2.01 2.48 1.99 2.67
n 42 41 42 41 42 41
Likelihood of confessing 
action 











Note. “I” indicates intrinsic religious orientation, Έ ” indicates extrinsic orientation. Scores range from 1 to 10 with higher 
scores reflecting higher degrees of guilt, likelihood of confessing and repeating wrongful act, and likelihood of feeling 
good about the day off.
When self-reported guilt was used as the 
dependent variable (see Table 1), we found that 
intrinsics reported higher levels of guilt than extrin- 
sics, F (1,81) = 13-3, p  < •001. There was also a 
main effect for level of information, F (2,80) = 29.2, 
p < .001, as all participants increased their guilt rat- 
ings after the second scenario (talking to co- 
worker), t (82) = 4.1, p < .001, and decreased their 
guilt ratings after the third scenario (calling to con- 
fess act), t (81) = 6.5, p < .001.
When likelihood of committing a similar act in 
the future was the dependent variable (see Table 1), 
we found a significant main effect for religious orien- 
tation, F (1,81) = 17.0, p < .001, with intrinsics report- 
ing less likelihood of repeating the behavior than 
extrinsics (intrinsics also reported less likelihood of 
calling in sick in the first place, t (80) = 3.4, p < .005. 
There was also a main effect for level of information, 
F (2,80) = 5.8, p < .005, as all participants reported 
decreasing their likelihood of calling in sick in the 
future after reading the second scenario.
split-plot anova was computed with religious orien- 
tation as one factor and level of information (see- 
nario 1-scenario 2) as the repeated-measures factor. 
Third, to assess the effects of the scenarios, additional 
2x2 Analyses of Variance (anovas)  were performed 
with religious orientation (intrinsic-extrinsic) as one 
factor and case outcome (grace-no grace) as the 
other. Again, a conservative alpha level of .01 was 
used to control for the inflated likelihood of Type I 
error that comes with multiple hypothesis tests. 
Fourth, we used correlations and multiple regression 
to determine if guilt plays a mediating role in the 
relationship between intrinsic religiousness and vari- 
ous outcome measures.
Results
Several interesting main effects emerged when 
the 2 x3 split-plot anovas were used to evaluate self- 
reported emotions and predicted behavior for intrin- 
sically- and extrinsically-religious participants. No 
significant interaction effects were observed.
RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND GUILT194
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations fo r Final-Scenario Forgiveness Items in Which 












** p  < .01 *** p  < .001
selves as more likely to confess to their boss after 
the first and second scenarios than extrinsics, F 
(1,81) = 26.7, p  < .001. All participants, regardless of 
religious orientation, reported themselves as more 
likely to confess their wrong after the second see- 
nario than after the first, F (1,81) = 55.0, p < .001. No 
significant interactions were found.
In order to assess reported likelihood of confes- 
sion, forgiveness, and the emotional consequences of 
the scenarios, several additional 2x2 Analyses of 
Variance (anovas)  were performed with religious ori- 
entation (intrinsic-extrinsic) as one factor and case 
outcome (grace-no grace) as the other. Several differ- 
enees between intrinsics and extrinsics were noted.
Following the last scenario, intrinsics expressed a 
greater likelihood of forgiving themselves, F (1,79) ־
11.7, p < .005, and were more inclined than extrin- 
sics to report the likelihood of feeling forgiven by 
God, F (1,79) = 23.1, p < .001 (see Table 2). No 
main effects for case outcome and no significant 
interactions between religious orientation and out- 
come of the scenario were found.
Differences were also observed on the reported 
feelings after calling the boss in Scenario 3· Those in 
the grace condition reported that they would likely 
feel better that they had called than those in the no- 
grace condition, F (1,79) = 79.0, p < .001. In addi- 
tion, intrinsics reported feeling better about calling 
than extrinsics, F (1,79) = 15.7, p < .001. Extrinsics 
reported being more likely to feel good about the 
date than intrinsics, F (1,79) = 36.8, p < .001. There
When using participants’ likely feelings about 
getting the day off as a dependent variable (see 
Table 1), we found a main effect for religious orien- 
tation, F (1,81) = 9.8, p  < .005, with extrinsics report- 
ing themselves likely to feel better about having the 
day off than intrinsics. Again, there was also a main 
effect for level of information, F (2,80) = 8.8, p < 
.001, with participants reporting themselves likely to 
feel worse about getting the day off after talking to 
the co-worker (Scenario 2).
Thus, as participants received more information 
they reported themselves likely to experience 
greater feelings of guilt until they were told they 
confessed their misdeed, at which point the guilt 
decreased. Similarly, participants reported less likeli- 
hood of repeating the offense, and less probability 
of feeling satisfaction with getting the day off after 
reading the information in Scenario 2. Intrinsics 
reported more likelihood of guilt, less likelihood of 
repeating the offense, and less probable satisfaction 
with getting the day off than extrinsics.
We were also interested in knowing if partici- 
pants would report themselves as likely to confess 
their action after the first and second scenarios (see 
Table 1). This could not be assessed after the third 
scenario because confessing was given as part of 
the scenario. A 2x2 anova was computed for per- 
ceived likelihood of confession (as the dependent 
variable) with religious orientation as one factor and 
level of information (Scenario 1-Scenario 2) as the 
repeated-measures factor. Intrinsics reported them­
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Table 3
Correlations o f Selected Variables With Intrinsic Religiousness, Guilt, and Intrinsic Religious- 










Feel good about 
getting day off 
Likelihood of 
doing this again 
in the future
- .353**  -.445**  















Feel good about 
getting day off
**4 7 5־• *2 5 3- . - . 0 5 0
* p< . 05 ** p < .01
mediated the effects of intrinsic religiousness. How- 
ever, guilt partially mediated the relationship 
between intrinsic religiousness and the likelihood of 
repeating the offense, reported after scenario 1 
(Guilt: t = 2.6, p < .05; Intrinsicness: t = 2.6, p < 
.05—see Table 3).
Discussion
This study supports Richards’ (1991) somewhat 
surprising report that intrinsically religious individu- 
als are more prone to guilt than extrinsically reli- 
gious individuals. A reflexive interpretation of 
Richards’ findings and these data might be that 
intrinsically religious people are more guilt-prone 
and therefore more likely to disturb themselves with 
self-condemning thoughts and beliefs (Ellis, I960, 
1971, 1983, 1992a, 1992b). However, these results 
suggest that guilt may play a partially instrumental 
role for the intrinsically religious. This is consistent 
with Tangney’s (1991) findings that guilt-proneness 
is often related to empathy for others and reparative 
actions. Tangney and others (e.g., Wicker, Payne, & 
Morgan, 1983) have noted that guilt and shame are 
distinct emotions despite their commonalities.
The present study provides evidence that guilt 
among intrinsically religious individuals is not neces- 
sarily destructive. Intrinsically religious participants, 
with their heightened guilt response, were more
was no interaction between religious orientation and 
case outcome for feelings about the date.
Finally, we were interested in knowing if guilt 
mediates the relationship between intrinsic religious- 
ness and the self-reported dependent variables (like- 
lihood of confessing, feelings of enjoying the date, 
and so on). We used a method of identifying medi- 
ating variables adapted from that described by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we determined 
which Likert-scale dependent variables were signifi- 
cantly correlated with intrinsic religiousness. Second, 
we determined if there was a significant correlation 
between self-reported guilt and intrinsic religious- 
ness. If both these correlations were significant, we 
entered guilt and intrinsic religiousness (in that 
order) into a hierarchical multiple regression equa- 
tion attempting to predict scores on the dependent 
variable. If guilt had a significant correlation with the 
dependent variable and intrinsic religiousness did 
not (after partialling out the variance due to guilt), 
then guilt was taken to have a mediating effect on 
the outcome variable. Using this method, we found 
guilt to have a significant mediating effect on 
respondents’ feeling good about getting the day off 
after scenarios 1 (Guilt: t = 3-3, p < •005; Intrinsic- 
ness: t = 1.7, n s) and 2 (Guilt: t = 4.1, p < .001; 
Intrinsicness: t = 0.5, n s ). There were no other 
dependent variables for which guilt completely
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responses was not measured in this study. It is pos- 
sible that the intrinsically and extrinsically religious 
responded in socially desirable directions based on 
their understanding of the roles of guilt and confes- 
sion. In future studies a measure of social desirabili- 
ty of response style should be included. Third, the 
sampling method was not ideal. In order to get suf- 
ficient diversity in the sample, two groups were 
used. Those participants from the campus chapter of 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship were perhaps dis- 
tinct from the general psychology students in ways 
other than religious orientation. Researchers who 
are able to start with a larger research pool may 
offer more precise findings and interpretations in 
future studies. Fourth, the measurement of guilt was 
dependent on self-reported responses to Likert-scale 
items. Using an instrument with known reliability 
and validity would enhance the generalizability of 
the study. One instrument that shows initial promise 
is the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Invento- 
ry (Tangney, 1990). Finally, it seems likely that guilt 
is a multifaceted emotion that will require further 
distinction in the future. Mosher (1966) suggested a 
distinction between sex guilt, hostile guilt, and 
morality-conscience guilt many years ago, but clari- 
fying research has not followed his initial report.
The main contribution of this study is that it adds 
to the growing evidence that some forms of religious- 
ness and guilt are adaptive. Clinicians who discour- 
age guilt in their clients might be wise to consider the 
positive behaviors that are associated with guilt 
(McMinn, 1984). Richards (1991) wisely concludes:
Before intervening, counselors need to carefully assess 
whether guilt manifested by clients is realistic and poten- 
tially functional or irrational and dysfunctional, (p. 194)
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